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There has been a revigoration in recent years of discussions surrounding two 
independent traditional philosophical topics, but from a new perspective, 
and a shared analytical ground. The two topics are: the end of the world, and 
scepticism about the external world; the common analytical ground is that of 
anthropic reasoning. More precisely, the topics I have in mind regard the 
probability we should assign to our species going extinct in a short time to 
come, and the probability we should assign to the hypothesis that we are 
living in a Matrix-like computer simulation. As regards anthropic reasoning, 
it is customary to understand it as the formulation of an anthropic principle; 
we will adopt a formulation due to John Leslie (1996, p. 190): “observers 
can most expect to find themselves in the spatiotemporal regions where 
most of them are found”. 
 
In this paper I will propose and discuss an argument (1) combining the ideas 
typical to two previously exposed arguments —the Doomsday Argument 
(DA) and the Simulation Argument (SA)—but (2) having, at the same time, 
a conclusion contrary to both those of the aforementioned arguments, which 
I will call ‘the Doomsday Simulation Argument (DSA)’. I will first briefly 
 
 expose DA and SA, then I will formulate and defend the premises and 
analyse the conclusions of DSA. 
 
 
DOOMSDAY 
Let us then start with DA (Carter 199?, Leslie 1996). It is a fact that the 
human population is growing. By the end of 2004, there will be about 8 
billion humans on Earth. According to some estimations, by 2010 there will 
be more than 10 billion humans1, while in 2100 the human population will 
reach 27 billions (Leslie 1996, p. ?); as for the past, a realistic estimate of 
the number of humans that have ever lived so far is that of approximately 90 
billion. Thus our population in 2004 represents almost 10 per cent of all the 
humans that have lived so far. Applying the anthropic principle to one’s 
position in time, we should judge as more probable that we are in a temporal 
niche where most of the observers are located. More exactly, if we suppose 
that we are among the earliest 10 per cent of all the humans that will ever 
have lived, then the number of all the humans that will ever have lived (past, 
present, and future) is 900 billion. This number may be reached by 2500, 
which means that in this case we should expect the extinction of the human 
species in a few centuries. If, on the other hand, we expect to survive for 
millions of more years, then we are among less than 0.00000001 of all 
humans. According to the anthropic principle we should consider as more 
probable that we are among the 0.1 than among less than 0.00000001 of all 
humans. Hence, we should assign a proportionally higher probability to 
DOOM SOON! 
 For more clarity, let us formulate first the anthropic principle that 
plays the main role in DA, which we will call the Strong Indifference 
Principle (SIP): 
If we knew that a fraction x of all observers who will have ever lived are 
among those that have ever lived until and are alive at the time we make the 
observation, then, even if we know that we are in 2004,  our credence that 
we are among the earliest x of all observers should be equal to x. 
                                                 
1 Levin (1996, 570), cited by Smith (1997) 
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 SIP says, in effect, that one should consider as if one were a random sample 
from the set of all people who will ever have lived. In other words, one 
should reason as if being indifferent with respect to where one’s observed 
birth rank is located in time within the totality of birth ranks of all humans 
who will ever have lived.  
 
We call it strong because of the clause I have emphasised in the above 
formulation. And this is one reason for doubting the soundness of DA, 
which I will shortly continue to expose. The reason for this doubt is the 
limited reasonableness of such a clause: given that we know our temporal 
location, the requirement of reasoning as if we were a random sample of the 
set of all people, past, present, and future, is harder to accept. 
 
The next step in the argument is the application of Bayes’s theorem for 
belief updating. Bayes’s theorem relates four probabilities, given a 
hypothesis H and evidence E: the prior probability of H, p(H); the 
probability of E given H, p(E|H); the probability of E given nonH, 
p(E|nonH); and the posterior (the updated) probability of H given E, p(H|E). 
The formula is: 
 
p(H|E) =
p(H)p(E|H) + p(nonH)p(E|nonH)
p(H)p(E|H)
 
 
Let us then assign interpretations to H and E, and values to the probabilities. 
Our hypothesis H is that the human species will go extinct by, say, 2200, 
while E is the proposition that one is alive in 2004. Further, the negation of 
H will be considered equivalent to the truth of the proposition that we will 
survive for thousands of centuries, and H|E will represent the truth of H 
conditional on the truth E. Suppose our credence that the human species will 
go extinct by 2200 is only 1 per cent. Then we have the following 
assignment of values to the variables: 
 
p(H) = 0.01 
p(nonH) = 0.99 
p(E|H) = 0.1  
p(E|nonH) =  0.001 
 
Replacing them in Bayes’s formula we obtain: 
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p(H|E) =
0.01â0.1 + 0.99â0.001
0.01â0.1 ù 0.503
 
 
which means that we should update our prior from 1% to slightly more than 
50% chance of DOOM BY 2200! We can further observe that the more time 
we expect to survive, the higher will be the posterior probability of H given 
E. For example, if we expect to be around for millions of more centuries, the 
value of p(H|E) will approach unity. 
 
 
SIMULATION 
 
SA has been proposed by Nick Bostrom (2003), and is based on two 
assumptions. The first is that of substrate-independence of consciousness, 
which means that consciousness supervenes on any of a broad range of 
physical realizations, provided they implement the right sort of 
computational structures and processes. In other words, if one has the 
resources to implement sufficiently complex computational structures and 
processes, one is able to simulate consciousness2. The second assumption is 
that if our technological progress will continue for a sufficiently long time 
with the same pace as so far, then humankind will attain a posthuman stage 
of civilisation --with a maximal level of technological capabilities that one 
can currently consider as consistent with all the physical laws and all the 
material and energy constraints of our universe—and will be able, due to an 
immense computing power, to simulate a huge number of entire ancestor 
civilisations, including the mental processes that are manifested within 
them. 
 
Given these assumptions, the basic idea of SA is expressible by the 
following question, as Bostrom puts it: “if there were a substantial chance 
that our civilization will ever get to the posthuman stage and run many 
ancestor-simulations, then how come you are not living in such a 
simulation?” 
 
                                                 
2 Of course, one need not understand substrate-independence as necessary; it may be a 
contingent fact about our laws of nature, and so it is compatible with mind-body dualism. 
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 More formally, let us use the following notation: 
ƒp   = Fraction of all human-level technological 
civilizations that survive to reach a posthuman stage 
Hö   = Average number of individuals that have lived 
in a civilization before its reaching a posthuman stage  
Nö  = Average number of ancestor-simulations run by 
a posthuman civilization 
 
The actual fraction of all observers with human-type experiences that live in 
simulations is 
fsim=
fpHöNö + Hö
fpHöNö
 
 
and dividing by Hö  we get : 
fsim=
fpNö + 1
fpNö
 
Denoting the fraction of posthuman civilizations that contain at least some 
individuals who are interested in running ancestor-simulations and have the 
resources to run a significant number of these by ƒI, and the average number 
of ancestor-simulations run by such civilisations by N , we have 
ö
I
Nö = fINöI  
which gives us: 
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 fsim =
fpfINöI + 1
fpfINöI
 
 
Since, given the immense computing power of future posthuman 
civilisations, N  is extremely large, ƒ
ö
I sim will approach unity, unless ƒp, ƒI, 
or both approach zero. This means that at least one of the following three 
propositions must be true: 
 
(1) It is very likely that we go extinct before reaching a posthuman 
stage (ƒp ≈ 0). 
(2) It is very unlikely that some posthuman civilisation will contain 
at leat some individuals who are interested in and have resources 
to run a significant number of ancestor-simulations (ƒI ≈ 0). 
(3) It is almost sure that we are living in a computer simulation (ƒsim 
≈ 1). 
  
The principle that permits the assertion of (3) is similar to SIP, but also 
different from it in one respect; we will call it the Weak Indifference 
Principle (WIP). 
 
Weak Indifference Principle (WIP): 
If we knew that a fraction x of all observers with human-type experiences 
live in simulations,  then, without knowing whether our own experiences are 
more likely to be biologically implemented than artificially simulated, our 
credence that we are living in a simulation should be equal to x. 
WIP says, similarly to SIP, that one should consider as if one were a random 
sample from the set of all people whith human-type experiences. In other 
words, one should reason as if being indifferent with respect to where one’s 
observed civilisation is located within the cyber-cum-natural space of all 
civilisations. 
 
The reason why we call it ‘weak’, and the difference between it and SIP, 
lies, again, in the emphasised clause, which states the indistinguishability 
from our perspective as observers of real from simulated experiences. 
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DOOMSDAY SIMULATION 
 
As I mentioned above, SIP states the implausible requirement that we 
should neglect the known fact that we actually are in 2004, and reason as if 
we were a random sample from the set of all the people who wil ever have 
have lived. The problem I see with WIP is that whilst it is certainly weaker, 
in the sense I explained, than SIP, there is a sense in which it is stronger 
than it. More exactly, in order for it to be usable in SA we have to assume 
not only that we don’t know which population we belong to (one of the 
many simulated ones or one of the few real ones), given the 
indistinguishability of simulated and real minds, but also, even if implicitly, 
that we don’t know which time we are actually living. SA shares with DA 
one important factor or variable: time. In DA we know the time slice we are 
ocuppying, and nevertheless prescribe indifference with respect to our 
temporal location. In SA time is also important; reaching a posthuman stage 
requires time, and so the more time we expect to survive, the more probable 
that a huge number of simulations are actually run. To accept WIP as a 
premise for a valid SA means, in effect, to accept that we don’t know that 
we are in 2004. But this should be, as far as I see, an assumption of ours for 
SA to get off the ground; the only thing we should have no information 
about is whether we are simulated or real, not whether we are at the 
beginning of the 21st century or not. 
 
The problems for DA and SA can be summarized as follows: DA is based 
on SIP, which is too strong to be asserted, and SA is based on WIP, which is 
sufficiently weak to be asserted, but requiring a too strong further 
assumption to be conjoined with in order for SA to go through. SIP can be 
represented as: 
 
(Kp & Kq) ⊃ IND {H1, H2, …, Hn}, 
 
while WIP as 
 
(Kr & ∼Ks) ⊃ IND {H*1, H*2, …, H*n}, 
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 where K is the knowledge operator, p and q, like r and s, are propositions 
we are in certain epistemic relations with according to the premises of DA 
and SA, respectively, {H1, H2, …, Hn} is the hypothesis space, and IND 
{…} means indifference with respect to the elements of the hypothesis 
space {…}. The problem with SIP is the questionableness of the conditional 
itself, because of the Kq component. As opposed to SIP, the conditional 
expressed by WIP is unproblematic, but the second conjunct of its 
antecedent, Kr & ∼Ks, which should be asserted as a premise if SA is to go 
through, is problematic for the reasons I have given above. 
 
In order to avoid these problems one should find a set of assumptions such 
that they would require a more reasonable indifference principle, which I 
will call the Middling Indifference Principle (MIP), having the following 
form: 
 
 
(Kt & Ku & ∼Kv) ⊃ IND {H1, H2, …, Hn}, 
 
and the following two properties: the conditional’s truth is not questionable 
and the conjuncts of the premise that needs to be asserted for the argument 
based on the principle to go through — Kt & Ku & ∼Kv — are 
unproblematic. This set of assumptions is provided by the argument I 
propose: the Doomsday Simulation Argument (DSA). It combines 
assumptions from DA and SA. 
 
The basic assumption inherited from DA is that we know which time we are 
living, and that inherited from SA is that we don’t know which population 
we belong to. These basic assumptions correspond to Ku and Kv in MIP; Kt 
represents a supposition of DSA, just as DA’s supposition is that we are 
among the earliest faction x of all people who will ever have lived, and SA’s 
supposition is that there is a fraction x of observers who live in simulations. 
DSA’s supposition is a compound proposition, based on the following idea. 
If a posthuman civilisation contains some individuals interested and having 
resources to run a huge number of simulations, then it is more probable that 
these simulations are run with the purpose of evaluating the risks of 
extinction of the simulating species and the ways to avoid it by using the 
simulated species as the experimental subject of exposure to such unique 
risks, than with the purpose of entartainment. The uniqueness of these risks 
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 is well pointed out by Bostrom (2002), who calls them ‘existential risks’ 
(and offers a very interesting classification and analysis of them): 
 
 Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no 
opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, 
limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must 
take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of 
threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the 
costs (moral and economic) of such actions. 
And this uniqueness creates a strong incentive for posthuman civilisations to 
expose simulated populations to such risks3.  
 
Further, such a simulated world will have its human population gone extinct 
at a certain time. We should distinguish between the simulated time and the 
time of the simulation; the simulation of a whole human history of, say, 100 
million years may take no more than one second for the posthuman 
civilisation to run, given its immense computing power. This one second 
interval belongs to the time of the simulating society, it is the time of the 
simulation, while the 100 million years interval belongs to the time of the 
simulated world, it is the simulated time.  
 
                                                 
3 There is an obvious objection that can be formulated, which my phrasing apparently 
invites: presumably, in a posthuman civilisation it will be considered quite unethical to 
experiment even with simulated people  (Aranyosi 2004) and so it is improbable that such a 
civilisation would actually run such simulations. My reply is that by simulating an ancestor 
evolutionary history without deliberately programming existential risks to be faced by the 
simulated civilisation, but by letting that world to evolve in a risk environment close to the 
objective risk environment of the simulating civilisation, is far from the admittedly 
reprehensible practice of exposing simulated people to abnormally high levels of stress 
caused by abnormally high risks. The only difference between the simulating and the 
simulated civilisations is that the latter can observe and analyse the evolution of millions of 
generations in no more than one second, just as our present-day simulations of millions of 
generations of (comparatively very primitive) artificial societies, like Epstein and Axtell’s 
(1996) SUGARSCAPE, takes a few hours. But even this advantage is a relative one: simulated 
civilisations may last for a long enough time to become posthuman and run their own 
ancestor-simulations on powerful simulated computers, “virtual machines”; the seeds of 
such computers are, as Bostrom (2003) points out, found in today’s virtual machines, like 
Java script web-applets, which run on a virtual machine inside your desktop. 
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 We shall say that a whole simulated world is ‘a matrix’4, a name inspired by 
the movie The Matrix5, and we will call ‘the order of the matrix’ the 
simulated time at which the matrix’s human observer population goes 
extinct. A matrix of order n will be denoted by ‘matrixn’ and will be 
understood as a matrix whose human population lasts for n years.  
 
Then the two basic assumptions inherited by DSA from DA and SA, 
respectively are: (a) that we know our simulated time we are living, and (b) 
that we don’t know which matrix we belong to. In this way DSA, unlike its 
ancestors, DA and SA, can accommodate two plausible assumptions. 
Finally, DSA’s supposition is: 
 
We are among the earliest fraction x, in some matrix, of the totality of 
people that will ever have lived in that matrix, and there is a fraction y of all 
observers, who live in matrices. 
 
For simplicity, we will asume (1) that time is discrete, with a granularity of 
1 year, (2) that the huge number of matrices are uniformly distributed on the 
line of natural numbers, with a one-one correspondence between the 
numbers and the orders of matrices, and (3) that the posthuman civilisation 
starts all the matrices simultaneously. 
 
Then, assumption (a) means that we know we are in a matrix of order 
greater or equal to 2004, and assumption (b) means that we don’t know the 
order of the matrix we are living in. Let us then assign interpretations and 
values for the variables occurring in Bayes’s theorem, supposing we give a 
probability of only 1 per cent to DOOM SOON, and start, as we did in DA, 
with the assumption of our being among the earliest 10 per cent in some 
matrix. 
 
H = doomsday by 2200 = we are in matrixn ≈ 2200 
 
non-H = survival for thousands of centuries = we are in matrixn > k >>  2200 
 
                                                 
4 See Chalmers (2003), for a discussion of skepticism versus  matrix scenarios. 
5 I should note that, unlike in The Matrix, here we have a simulation of all the physical 
reality, including brains, which reality will automatically contain, given the assumption of 
substrate-independence, our minds. 
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 E = one is alive in 2004 = one is in matrixn ≥ 2004 
 
E|H = one is alive in 2004, given that he is in matrixn ≈ 2200 
 
p(H) = 0.01 
p(non-H) = 0.99 
p(E|H) = 0.1  
 
 
The most important part to the argument is the value we should assign to the 
probability of being an observer in 2004 conditional on the human species 
surviving for thousands of centuries, p(E|non-H). Since non-H means that 
we are in some matrix of an order situated between the values of n and k, 
and since according to our MIP, SIP is an intra-matrix applicable rule, while 
WIP is an inter-matrix applicable one, p(E|non-H) will be obtained by 
summing over the fractions observers occupy in the intra-matrix sets of all 
observers corresponding to each matrix order between n and k:  
 
p(E|non-H) =  
P
,i=k
n fi
 
 
where ƒi = the fraction of all the humans who will ever have lived within 
which our current population is located (i.e. the fraction all humans that 
have ever lived up to 2004 represent in the total number of humans, past, 
present, and future), if we are in a matrix of order i (i.e. a matrix whose 
human population lasts for i years). 
 
Applying Bayes’s theorem then we have 
 
p(H|E)=
0.01â0.1 + 0.99P
i=k
n
fi
0.01â0.1
.
 
 
Since 
 
lim
nàk( )→∞
X
i=k
n
fi = 1,
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 if, n , then à k ý 1 X
i=k
n
fi ù 1
 
  
and thus p(H|E) ≈ 0.001. This means nothing else than that we should 
update our prior for DOOM SOON from 1% to 0.01 %! 
 
For the sake of completeness, here are some calculations (assuming linear6 
population growth): 
 
For k – 2004 = 100,000 years, p(E|H) = p(E|non-H) = 0.1 at n ≈ 1,600,000 
⇔ H’s posterior equals its prior. 
For k – 2004 = 100,000 years, 0.1 = p(E|H) << p(E|non-H) ≈ 1, at n ∈ (107, 
108) ⇔ H’s posterior much lower than its prior. 
 
As a consequence, if the reasoning behind DA and SA is impeccable, then 
that behind DSA should be impeccable as well. At the same time, DSA fares 
better than its ancestors because it is based on more plausible assumptions, 
which make applicable a more reasonable indifference principle, MIP. 
Finally, and most importantly, there is nothing paradoxical about the 
predictions of DSA. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS OF DSA 
 
By inspecting our last three formulae one can draw two main conclusions, 
which, we can further observe, buttress each other. 
 
First conclusion: the more time we expect to be around, the less the 
probability we should assign for DOOM SOON, after Bayesian updating, 
because the more the probability of our being in a matrix of very high rather 
than very low order! 
                                                 
6 Of course, if population grows exponentially, n will take much higher values. It is not 
essential, however, for the argument to assume linear growth; it will still be true on the 
assumption of exponential growth that there will be a value for n sufficiently high to render 
p(E|H) << p(E|non-H), and thus p(H|E) less than p(H). 
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Second conclusion: the more time we expect to be around, the higher the 
probability, after many iteration of Bayesian updating, of our being in the 
SUPERMATRIX (the matrix of highest order = REALITY), i.e. the more 
probable that it is we ourselves (or, more exactly, those whose flesh-and-
blood ancestors are us) who will create all or many of the matrices! 
 
 
AN OBJECTION AND A REPLY 
 
The second of our conclusions is the more intriguing. Recall my objection to 
SA that it has to assert the hypothesis of our lacking information about our 
location in time, and that this makes it less convincing. At the same time, 
observe that SA is consistent from the point of view of betting odds based 
rationality. As Bostrom points out: 
 
If betting odds provide some guidance to rational belief, it may also be worth 
to ponder that if everybody were to place a bet on whether they are in a 
simulation or not, then if people use the bland principle of indifference [NB, 
our WIP], and consequently place their money on being in a simulation if 
they know that that’s where almost all people are, then almost everyone will 
win their bets. If they bet on not being in a simulation, then almost everyone 
will lose. 
 
Now one may object to my argument that it is apparently inconsistent with 
betting odds based considerations. Our second conclusion prescribes my 
betting on not being in a simulation, but I proceeded from the assumption I 
share with Bostrom that there will be a huge number of simulations in the 
future, and so I have to agree that most of the people live in simulations. 
Therefore, if I bet on not being in a simulation, and I recommend it to 
everybody, then almost everyone will lose their bets if they follow my 
advice. 
 
In response, I should first point out that the second conclusion does not 
recommend betting on not being in a simulation given that one knows that 
that’s where most of the people are found, but betting on not being in a 
simulation given that one expects the human race to last for an extremely 
long time. Second, and more to the point, consider the following betting 
prospect: 
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Get (a) $ sum equal to your bet times the number of the years you expect the 
species to survive if not simulated, otherwise get (b) $ sum equal to your bet 
times the difference in number of years between the longest lasting and your 
actual matrix. 
 
I think this betting prospect is a correct representation of the situation, given 
our previously explained assumptions. Now consider the two hypotheses: 
everyone bets on not being in a simulation and everyone bets on being in a 
simulation. It is I think clear that the former case implies, with the 
assumption of an indefinitely high survival expectancy, a massive per capita 
monetary gain, while the latter a comparatively extremely low one.  
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